












The role of business in violations of human rights has been at the heart of international debates for decades. As early as the 1970s attempts were made at the UN by Global South nations (known as the G-77) to establish internationally-binding mechanisms to address corporate violations of human rights. Ultimately, those attempts were watered down into “codes of conduct”. In the early 1990s, the “Washington Consensus” was used to steer states to deregulate and restructure their economies in a race-to-the-bottom and place emphasis upon integrating the global economy over human rights and environmental protection. Although corporate violations existed before, it was only at this juncture that many human rights cases were brought into public view. Some litigation was pursued, but it was most often in tort, and sometimes in criminal courts. The article argues that the existing regional human rights courts have bolstered corporate human rights, while at the same time have remained on the sidelines of addressing corporate accountability. The emergent ASEAN human rights system has not yet developed a human rights court. The article suggests that there are key grassroots movements shaping human rights discourses around corporate accountability in the region and that these offer exciting prospects for an alternative approach to addressing corporate accountability in a prospective supervisory mechanism.
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Introduction 
As early as the 1970s attempts were made at the UN by Global South nations (known as the G-77) to establish internationally-binding mechanisms to address corporate violations of human rights. Ultimately, those attempts were watered down into “codes of conduct” where corporations are now entrusted to regulate themselves. Self-regulation tied in nicely with the design of the late 1980s, early 1990s “Washington Consensus”, which was used to steer states to deregulate and restructure their economies in a race-to-the-bottom. Emphasis was placed upon integrating the global economy over respect for human rights and environmental protection. Notwithstanding, since the 1990s, corporations have faced some litigation with regards to their role in the production of harm. Legal action has most often been through tort or criminal courts, although few cases have resulted in formal judgements since most have been settled out-of-court.​[2]​ Human rights courts, however, have remained mostly on the sidelines of addressing corporate human rights violations. This article considers the paradox at the European (ECtHR) and Inter-American Courts of Human Rights (IACtHR), which provide human rights protections for corporations, but do not adequately address corporate accountability.​[3]​ It uses the examination into this failure of existing human rights courts to reflect upon the future of corporate accountability in the newly-established Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) human rights system. What is relatively clear is that human rights discourses underpinning corporate accountability in the region are developing rapidly outside formal legal institutions and will likely be key forms of influence and/or resistances to possible developments within the ASEAN human rights system.
	The role of business in violations of human rights has been at the heart of international debates for decades. There is empirical evidence that corporations, often in collusion with states, are involved in a variety of human rights violations; these include analogous forms of slave labour (e.g., Unocal in Burma); cultural genocide, ethnic discrimination and violations of the right to a healthy environment (e.g., Texaco in Ecuador); conspiracy leading to widespread intimidation and murder/death of activists (e.g., Royal Dutch Shell in Ogoni, Nigeria); murder, extra-judicial killings, kidnapping, unlawful detention and torture (e.g., Coca-Cola in Colombia); and culpable environmental disaster and wilful lack of observance for safety norms in the workplace (e.g., Union Carbide Bhopal in India; AZF-Total in France). More and more cases of corporate violations of human rights are surfacing—not because they did not exist before, but because of a growing interest and commitment to exposing corporate harms (Shamir, 2004). For over half a decade, there has been a prioritisation of capital over human rights, coupled by a failure in international human rights law to address corporate harms. Corporations have gained access to spaces of what Gilbert (2012) has referred to in another context as “nearly-absolute non-accountability”. A large part of corporate non-accountability can be attributed to the legal architecture of the corporation, specifically the corporate legal personality. 
	The article begins with a brief historical background of the legal architecture of the corporation. It argues that these legal constructions are the cornerstone to corporate human rights, which has given it access to the protections of human rights courts. Sections II and III provide a snapshot examination of the conceptualisation of the corporation at the ECtHR and IACtHR, respectively. There are important differences in how these jurisdictions have addressed corporations as “persons”; but, there are also similarities in how the corporation, as a legal person, is ultimately protected within both. These sections demonstrate how human rights law is used to protect the corporation—as a person—although it has proven problematic to apply human rights law to protect flesh and blood persons from corporate violations. Section IV reviews existing mechanisms to address corporate human rights violations in the regional courts and comments upon their efficacy. Section V focuses upon the impact of the prioritisation of economic integration over human rights and environmental protections during the neoliberalisation of the global economy and the consequences this has had for the ASEAN human rights system. The article concludes with some comments upon possible spaces to challenge the status quo that may be worth bearing in mind in the development of this new regional human rights system. 

The anthropomorphisation of the corporation
The rationale for corporate human rights can be located in the development of legal personhood, first in American and English courts in the late 19th Century, and later bolstered in the regional human rights courts in the second half of the 20th Century. The complete separation of the company from its members effectively anthropomorphised the corporation, making it a “legal person” separate from its members. This development was confirmed in the landmark case Salomon v Salomon (1897), where the English court established that shareholders of an insolvent company could not be sued for outstanding debts. The Salomon case provided judicial confirmation that the shareholder and the company were distinct persons, embedding the principle of the corporate veil. It was at this juncture that the corporation developed from an economic structure—based on an accumulated capital fund, involving many people, whose membership takes the impersonal form of a freely transferable share and whose participation in management is minimal—into a legal and political institution with a specific legal status—incorporated and subject to the rules of company law that also applies to all incorporated businesses, i.e., single proprietorships, transnational corporations (TNCs), etc. (Ireland, 1984, 1996, 2010; Picciotto, 2011: 108-121). What this meant in practice was that along with limited liability, the doctrine of the separate personality, upheld in Salomon v Salomon, resulted in the increasing acceptance of the corporation as a legal form of association with no economic connotations at all (Ireland, 1996). The development of the corporation from economic entity to legal person required the creation of a new body of law. Old doctrines were discarded or adapted to respond to the changing conditions of capital. In the US, the courts radically promoted the notion of corporate personhood by granting corporations protection under the 14th Amendment. The Supreme Court asserted the property rights of the corporation as its own legal entity in the case Santa Clara County v Southern Pacific Railway Co. (1886), when it decided that the due process clause barred the state of California from taxing the property of a railroad corporation differently from that of individuals. The Court asserted the property rights of the corporation as its own legal entity. 
	The role of legal actors in creating and legitimising corporate personhood through judicial decision-making should not be underestimated, since the legal fiction of corporate personality is arguably the cornerstone to corporate human rights. Through interpretation the courts have institutionally legitimised the corporation as a political unit, making it an object of human rights in the 20th Century (see Khoury and Whyte, 2017: 138-142). As a legal person, and thus an object of rights, the ECtHR grants corporations the protections of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). What this means in practice, is that the ECtHR, a human rights court, considers corporations potential “victims” of state-authored human rights violations but it does not consider the responsibility of corporations for their human rights violations.​[4]​ International human rights law is state-centred, meaning that the state is solely responsible before human rights courts for violations of human rights law.
	There are distinct differences between the ECtHR and the IACtHR with regards to how each human rights system has addressed corporations as “persons”, but there are also similarities in how the corporation, as a legal person, is ultimately protected within both. The following two sections exam the development of corporate rights in the existing courts; this examination helps identify some of the current gaps in the law with regards to corporate accountability. The regional approaches illustrate a fundamental contradiction in human rights law: corporations can invoke human rights for their protection, but it is difficult to use those same laws to protect humans from corporations. It is to a discussion of the privileged positions of corporations and shareholders in the ECtHR and IACtHR that we now turn.

The ECtHR: Protecting corporations as legal persons
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) was adopted in 1950. Two years later, the Council of Europe enshrined the protection of property into the Convention by way of its First Protocol. Article 1, Protocol 1 (P1-1) extended Convention protections to legal persons.​[5]​ The inclusion of legal persons has had a significant impact on the conceptualisation of rights in Europe. 
	It was probably not the intention of the ECHR drafters to grant corporations human rights (Schwelb, 1964; also, Khoury, 2014; Khoury and Whyte, 2017).​[6]​ In his analysis, Schwelb (1964: 520) observed that in the French version of Article 34 ECHR, which defines the right to petition and application of the Convention, “person” is translated as “toute personne physique” (“all physical persons”). He argued that a legal person does not, therefore, have the right to petition unless it is an NGO or a group of individuals. The application of the ECHR to corporations might therefore be the consequence of the judicial interpretation (Khoury, 2014; Khoury and Whyte, 2017). One of the first applicants to invoke P1-1 was the Swiss company, Retimag S.A., a company established by the German Communist Party to administer its property. It was in the case Retimag S.A. v Federal Republic of Germany (1961) that the ECtHR interpreted the Convention to accept the company as a rights-holder by likening it to an NGO, whose legal personhood had been accepted in the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) 1949 Advisory Opinion on Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations. What is significant in this case is that the ECtHR never challenged the locus standi of the applicant corporation. It uncritically corroborated the corporation’s human rights. This was a watershed for corporate human rights in Europe and the ECtHR continues to expand upon its interpretation of corporate rights. 
	The ECtHR has enlarged the scope of corporate human rights to include those once reserved for human claimants; for example, in Société Colas Est v France (2002), it applied Article 8 (respect of family life) to the company, and in Comingersoll S.A. v Portugal (2000) in the Concurring Opinion, the corporation was described as “an independent living organism”. It has moved its case law increasingly into a realm that is commercial in nature (e.g., Anheuser-Busch v Portugal 2001; for comments, see Reiss, 2011). Over the years, the ECtHR has shown a clement approach to corporate “victims”. In Capital Bank AD v Bulgaria (2006), the Court was asked to consider its admissibility since the company was undergoing liquidation. The company claimed violations of its right to a fair trial (Art. 6), property (P1-1) and effective remedy (Art. 13). On considering the admissibility of Capital Bank AD, the Court commented that striking the application would undermine the very essence of the right of individual applications by legal persons and unanimously found in favour of the applicant. The protection of the corporation as a legal person was undisputed by the judges, demonstrating the embeddedness of corporate human rights in Europe. It has been decisive in institutionalising corporate rights and supporting a market-oriented conception of human rights in Europe by prioritising the right to property. Tim Allen (2010: 1056) has argued that the pre-eminence of property at the Court has meant that, “Increasingly, the free market represents the norm for judging all State action affecting property, and the Court cannot even conceptualise an alternative perspective on property.” However, it is not because corporations are viewed as rights-holders by the ECtHR that this status is necessarily part of the general public’s common sense; and it most certainly does not connote a futility to challenging those rights. 
	As the oldest regional human rights court, the ECtHR has played a key role in defining human rights around the world. But the unique socio-economic and historical contexts of the other regional courts have impacted upon their case law and marked their judgements in different ways. The Inter-American human rights system, for example, has built its reputation upon its unique approach to cases of human rights violations by military juntas and dictatorship regimes, as well as its innovative approach to indigenous rights. Moreover, unlike its European counterpart, the ACHR formally rejects legal persons at Article 1.2.; nonetheless, as we explore in the next section, the IACtHR has made certain interpretations indicating a move towards a more business-friendly human rights regime.

Corporate rights in the Inter-American system
The Inter-American human rights system is composed of the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (IACommHR, established in 1959), a quasi-judicial, quasi-political institution, and the Court (established in 1979). It is the role of the Commission to recommend cases to the Court. These institutions are bound by the ACHR, although the IACommHR also draws upon the American Declaration of Rights and Duties of Man (1948); this is important because although the Court does not recognise legal persons, the Commission has interpreted the American Declaration’s protection of “all persons” to recognise some corporate human rights (see ABC Color v. Paraguay, 1984, and Jehovah Witnesses v. Argentina, 1978). Recently, however, the IACtHR has also widened its interpretation of the Convention to the ultimate benefit of corporate interests by guaranteeing a prerogative to corporate shareholders. 
	In its early years, the IACommHR claimed it did not have jurisdiction over applications by legal persons (see 105 Shareholders of the Bank of Lima v Peru, 1991). It has since changed its tune. Leonie Timmers argues that, “[t]he Commission has started granting rights that are ultimately for the benefit of legal persons, although the claims still have to be brought by natural persons” (2013: 153; see Gabriela Perozo et al. v Venezuela, 2009). This approach has been supported by the IACtHR, which held that individuals may petition the Commission to enforce individual rights even in cases where these rights are substantively for the corporation (Van Kempen, 2010). A key case that demonstrates this approach is Cantos v Argentina (2001). The applicant indirectly sought human rights protections for his companies. Following an audit by the Revenue Department, Mr. Cantos claimed that his companies began to incur financial losses due to the seizures of business records needed to complete certain transactions, and the impossibility to mount defences against the companies’ creditors. Although the Court confirmed that only human beings are protected by the Convention, it nonetheless noted that “in general, the rights and obligations attributed to companies become rights and obligations for the individuals who comprise them or who act in their name or representation” (Cantos, 2001, §27). It went on to specify that, “although the figure of legal entities has not been expressly recognized by the American Convention … this does not mean that, in specific circumstances, an individual may not resort to the Inter-American system for the protection of human rights to enforce his fundamental rights, even when they are encompassed in a legal figure or fiction created by the same system of law” (Ibid., §29). The Court accepted Mr. Cantos’ application since he originally filed under his “own name and in the name of his companies” (Ibid., §30). According to Khoury and Whyte (2017: 160), “… cases of shareholder rights have been fundamental in the transition of the Inter-American human rights system towards an ultimate benefit for legal persons.” In its final judgement, the IACtHR found Argentina had violated the Convention, extending human rights protections to Mr. Cantos’ companies. 
	Thus, the IACtHR’s decisions, in some key cases, have pierced the corporate veil to protect shareholders and safeguard the corporation. The subtle move towards protecting business interests has meant that the statutory differences between the European and Inter-American Courts are less significant than they might first appear. In Europe, the corporation has human rights as its own “person”; in the Americas, shareholders are recognised as rights-holders even when the protections sought are for the corporation. Either way, it remains that corporate interests have made their way into both human rights courts, albeit in different ways. The common ground is that both courts recognise the distinct legal personalities of shareholders and companies (Khoury and Whyte, 2017), a principle established by the ICJ’s 1970 landmark case Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. Ltd (Belgium v Spain). 
	Most recently, the IACtHR has moved even further towards providing corporations with a backdoor opening to the Inter-American human rights system. In an Advisory Opinion “Entitlement of legal entities to hold rights under the Inter-American human rights system” requested by Panama (2016), the Court was explicitly asked to consider the issue of the recognition of legal persons. The question centred upon whether all legal entities, such as corporations, but also indigenous communities and labour unions, have the same rights. The Court’s response was firstly, in certain cases individuals can exercise their rights through legal persons; and secondly, in certain cases where domestic remedies have been exhausted by legal persons, physical persons can apply to the IACommHR in their stead, and so eventually too the IACtHR. The Court justified this interpretation as the rights granted to a physical person through their “participation” in a legal person (Ibid., §106). It commented that: 

“… whilst legal persons have not been expressly recognised by the American Convention, this does not restrict the possibility that under certain circumstances, an individual exercising his rights through a legal person, can petition the Inter-American system of human rights for the protection of their fundamental rights even when those fall under a legal person or fiction created by the same legal system” (Ibid., §107, transl. from Spanish by author).

The Advisory Opinion opens a Pandora’s box for corporate human rights. Although it has remained stalwart in its position that only physical persons are protected by the ACHR, this interpretation has opened the door to the Inter-American human rights system to ultimately benefit corporations.
	Neither the IACtHR nor the ECtHR consider corporations as subjects of human rights, meaning that corporations are unaccountable for the violations they commit (for a discussion of the legal subjectivity of corporations, see Jägers, 1999). So, although corporations are objects of human rights with all the protections that implies, only states are accountable for violations before human rights courts. The following section considers the mechanisms available to human rights courts to address this gap; these are positive obligations, the horizontal effect, duty to prevent and due diligence. The overview of these mechanisms provides some precedents for the developing ASEAN human rights system.

Mechanisms to address corporate accountability
A positive obligation is a state’s obligation to secure the effective enjoyment of a fundamental right, as opposed to the classic negative obligation to merely abstain from human rights violations. Positive obligations compromise a set of normative obligations for the state to ensure the enjoyment of rights by individuals through adequate legislation and enforcement. The state is, thus, required to intervene to prevent violations by corporations or protect human rights guarantees that are being compromised by corporations, even in the private sphere. Both the ECtHR and the IACtHR regularly apply the doctrine in their case law. 
	A related but more politically charged mechanism is the “horizontal effect”, which triggers the responsibility of the state for a rights violation by a non-state actor. The key difference between the doctrine of positive obligations and the horizontal effect is that positive obligations require the state to intervene to protect human rights—to do something. The horizontal effect makes the state responsible for having allowed a violation by a third party to occur. In some cases, “responsibility is attributed to the state where it can be clearly proven that a private body exercising the services or functions generally undertaken by the public authority has violated a human right” (Spielmann, 1995: 64-65). The state becomes responsible for a human rights violation by one individual towards another because it did not fulfil its duty to prohibit or prevent the violation from occurring.​[7]​ 
	The ECtHR has held that preventative legislation is not necessarily enough to protect the human rights of one individual against another, and has emphasised that preventative operational measures may also be necessary (Osman v UK, 1998, §115; Osmanoglu v Turkey, 2008). This principle is known at the ECtHR as the “duty to prevent” and applies most notably to violations of the right to life and the right to personal integrity (Osman v UK, 1998). The ECtHR applied the same principle in Öneryildiz v Turkey (2004), concluding that the positive obligation to safeguard the right to life extends to public and private activities, stating that, “this [positive] obligation must be construed as applying in the context of any activity, whether public or not, in which the right to life may be at stake, and a fortiori in the case of industrial activities, which by their very nature are dangerous …” (Ibid., §71). The ECtHR’s “duty to prevent” shares some commonalities with the IACtHR’s “due diligence standard”.
	The due diligence standard triggers state responsibility for a human rights violation by a non-state actor, but also requires the state to provide a remedy for the violation. The difference between the courts is, thus, that at the IACtHR not only is the state responsible for allowing the violation to occur, it must also punish the private party as part of its obligation to provide an effective remedy, even retroactively. At the ECtHR, state responsibility lies in monetary compensation to the victim and national remedies for the future. The obligation to protect human rights that emanates from the ACHR obliges states “to prevent, investigate and punish any violation of the rights recognized by the Convention and, moreover, if possible attempt to restore the right violated and provide compensation as warranted for damages resulting from the violation” (Godínez-Cruz v Honduras, 1989, §175; Velásquez-Rodríguez v Honduras, 1988, §166). Member states undertake to “respect the rights and freedoms recognized by the Convention” (Velásquez Rodríguez, 1988, §165), but also to “guarantee the free and full exercise of those rights to everyone in its jurisdiction, including with regards to the actions and omissions of third parties” (Ibid., §166).
	There are a handful of cases where these mechanisms have been applied to consider state responsibility for corporate harms. At the ECtHR, these include López Ostra v Spain (1994); Guerra v Italy (1998); Fadeyeva v Russia (2005); Öneryildiz v Turkey (2004); Taşkin and Others v Turkey (2004); Tatar v Romania (2009); and Budayeva v Russia (2008). Claims against corporations have been more explicit at the IACtHR where the applicants are most often indigenous communities trying to protect their lands and heritage from state concessions to corporations, often from the extractive industry. Examples of these cases are Yanomami v Brazil (1985); Kichwa People of the Sarayaku v Ecuador (2012); the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community of the Enxet-Lengua People v Paraguay (2005); Comunidad Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni v Nicaragua (2004); and Mayas Indigenous Community of the Toledo District v Belize (2004).​[8]​ Despite these mechanisms that allow the courts some scope into the private sphere, both courts promote the traditional application of international human rights law, one that stipulates a state-centred approach to human rights. Consequently, neither corporations, nor shareholders can be held accountable for human rights violations in either system. 
	There is a profound paradox in the regional human rights systems: “they conceptualise corporations as objects of human rights law for the purposes of their own protection, but not as subjects of human rights law, for the purposes of our protection” (Khoury and Whyte, 2017: 153). The ASEAN region is witnessing strong grassroots mobilisations with “people-centred” human rights approaches that are carving out spaces within which this paradox might be challenged. The “people-centred” approach is based on collective actions that have risen from the ground up and are challenging a Western conception of rights with its focus upon the state and individuals as bearers of a limited set of civil and political rights. Although officially the ASEAN claims to integrate a “people-centred” approach, it has been criticised for its adaptation, which focuses more upon an inclusion of civil society to legitimate its market-building reform programme (Gerard, 2015). 
	The ASEAN human rights system is in its infancy, but there is already criticism of member states for showing weak political commitment to establishing regional human rights governance (Middleton and Pritchard, 2013; Davies, 2014). Consequently, any consideration of the possibility that the ASEAN establish a human rights supervisory mechanism can only be speculative (for a “blueprint”, see Phan, 2009); notwithstanding, it is worth reflecting upon what we know so far about the nascent ASEAN human rights regime to contemplate a more participatory, democratic and representative human rights system. 

Corporate accountability in the ASEAN? 
The debt crises of the 1980s and 1990s, although of different natures across the globe, provided the pretext for international financial institutions (IFIs), such as the World Bank and IMF, to fix structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) for indebted countries, which included massive finance and market liberalisation. Ultimately, the IFIs sought to integrate the economies of the Global South into the global capitalist economy defined by global trade, finance and investment (Panitch and Gindin, 2013: 234-245). Peet (2009) argues that the IFIs, led by the US and its economic allies, steered the targeted national economies in the economic and political direction that they favoured. During the 1997 Asian financial crisis, for example, Asian countries were encouraged to create Export Processing Zones (EPZs), which were predicated upon deregulation and cutbacks in the enforcement of environmental and labour standards, which has led to a permissive environment for violations of human rights (for a discussion, see Klein, 2000). Southeast Asian economies have attracted industries based on low-cost, labour-intensive manufacturing that has included a downward regulatory spiral, or “race-to-the-bottom”. The ASEAN Inter-governmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), established in 2009, has been reticent to take a firm position regarding corporate accountability, perhaps because of the role of IFIs in the region and a sustained focus upon “development”—despite that “development” has overtaken poverty as the single largest cause of human rights violations and environmental degradation in South Asia (Dias, 2000: 415). 
	Since the establishment of the ASEAN human rights system, most states in the ASEAN have recognised the major international human rights treaties. The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD) explicitly notes a “commitment to the [UDHR], the Charter of the [UN], the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, and other international human rights instruments” (ASEAN, 2012: Preamble). Despite this, member states lack engagement and there is a notable trend to endorse areas that are considered less politically sensitive, but to hold off on more overtly political areas. Even when ratified, Davies (2014) argues, ASEAN member states continue to use reservations to avoid obligations, and declarations to interpret the treaties in ways that work against their purpose. Given the disparities amongst “commitments” to human rights across the region, he suggests that the future of human rights in the ASEAN may be one characterised by further divisiveness, rather than integration. Although this may be true at the government level, the same cannot necessarily be said at the grassroots, where the people-centred approach has seen considerable international support between informal community groups, including in establishing and participating in Peoples Tribunals (PTs).​[9]​ Although PTs are not recognised as legally binding, they provide an important space for communities affected by violations to monitor and expose human rights violations by state and non-state actors, in many cases where those violations have not been adequately addressed in formal legal fora.
	Since its inception in 1967, the ASEAN has accelerated its integration into the global market economy. One consequence of the policies favouring integration has been that local populations have lost access to natural resources due to development-based resource extraction and exploitation (Middleton and Pritchard, 2013). This resource intensive economic model has led to environmental degradation and empirically-evidenced state-corporate violations of human rights.​[10]​ Governments across the region have placed a political emphasis on further liberalising the region’s economy and facilitating trade and investment, while human rights guarantees and environmental protections have not been given the same attention (Ibid.). Some civil society organisations argue that the gap between the ASEAN emphasis on the economy and pro-business orientation over human rights is partly due to the economic model imposed by IFI’s (Focus on the Global South, 2012). This model emphasises market deregulation, trade liberalisation and privatisation of essential goods and services, all of which contribute to negative impacts upon human rights. 
	The evermore elaborate and austere policies spawned from SAPs, made it “… difficult to differentiate between their [SAPs] economic and their [SAPs] social, political, and even cultural dimensions…” (Panitch and Gindin, 2013: 241). This “holistic” approach compelled a political alignment to allow market liberalisation, often to attract foreign direct investments (FDI).​[11]​ Large, transnational corporations still maintain a strong position in the region, but most economic players in fact come from small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (Thomas and Chandra, 2014). These business entities, large and small, occupy an influential position in the ASEAN, both economically and politically, engaging in “partnerships” to develop corporate social responsibility (CSR) and so, arguably, control its discourse and scope. One example, amongst many, is the ASEAN-CSR-Network, which states as its mission: “To promote and enable responsible business conduct in ASEAN to achieve sustainable, equitable and inclusive social, environmental and economic development.” It is an “… advocate for CSR …” seeking to “promote the practice of CSR, and at times, providing representation for the business community to the ASEAN body and other inter-governmental agencies or think tanks on relevant policy issues concerning CSR” (ASEAN-CSR-Network, 2018). Ronan Shamir provides a convincing critique of corporate engagements such as these, and of CSR more generally, commenting upon the fact that “capitalists and capitalist entities do not sit still when faced with threats and challenges” (2004: 670). He expands upon the contradictions of CSR to show how they shape the notion of responsibility in ways that “diffuse its potentially radical application to [T]NCs” (Ibid.: 671). Shamir points to the deliberate strategies taken by corporations to avoid and prevent the use of law in attempts to develop greater corporate accountability. He further exams the role of corporate-oriented and corporate-sponsored NGOs in structuring CSR and argues that these organisations are ultimately embedded within corporate strategies. As such, it is unlikely that they might offer any binding legal challenges to corporate harms, but rather endorse voluntary initiatives.
	The AICHR has received criticism from civil society groups across the region for refusing to receive cases of human rights violations for investigation (Focus on the Global South, 2012). In 2011, it undertook a thematic study on the topic of CSR in the ASEAN. It has worked closely with several corporate-sponsored NGOs (e.g., ASEAN-CSR-Network, Amfori, etc.) and has implicated them in the design and agenda setting of its approach to CSR (see, e.g., Amfori, 2017). The thematic study has not led to any formal commitments or regulations. The following year, in 2012, the AICHR adopted a Human Rights Declaration (AHRD), although this too was heavily criticised from the outset due to a limitation of rights, a failure to meet minimum international human rights standards, and the lack of a grievance or supervisory mechanism. Middleton and Pritchard (2013: 9) have commented that, “the ‘ASEAN Way’ which emphasizes non-interference in the domestic affairs of other countries and consensus-based decision-making resulting in the lowest common denominator for all agreements has also been a barrier to furthering [corporate accountability] gains, as reflected in the shortcomings of the … AHRD.” They point to the contradictions between company CSR reports that present favourable policies and corporate practices leading to violations on the ground to substantiate their claim. Voluntary standards have been widely criticised for being ineffective and there is a growing body of literature that argues that legally binding mechanisms are necessary to ensure the means to address corporate accountability (see Khoury and Whyte, 2017; Shamir, 2004). 
	The development of the ASEAN market has been heavily dependent upon FDI and corporate investments. Corporations occupy a privileged space in national and regional economies, which leads to the speculation that even if a human rights supervisory mechanism were established, corporations would very likely benefit from the existing legal advantages already present in other regional human rights courts. This account may sound defeatist, but perhaps there is room to manoeuvre considering the expanding role of mass-based movements and civil society, in conjunction with formal institutions, to apply pressure to governments that have ratified human rights treaties to further reforms (Neumayer, 2005). Local populations, indigenous peoples, and civil society organisations are already bringing attention to corporate human rights violations in the region; they are raising awareness, challenging and putting pressure on local and international discussions for binding legislation for corporate accountability. 

Conclusion
Corporations are conceptualised as rights-holders (i.e., objects of human rights) but are not formally considered subjects of international law. The status of the corporation in the regional human rights courts is formally very different: At the ECtHR, the corporation is the object of human rights, while at the IACtHR, it is the shareholder who is the object of human rights. But in both courts, corporations ultimately benefit from human rights; the case law in both regional courts demonstrates a business-friendly approach to human rights. Shareholders are rights-holders without responsibilities, and are quite literally “shielded from the law” (Glasbeek, 2002). 
	Corporate human rights emerged from legal interpretations in the 19th Century that granted corporations extraordinary privileges, including legal personhood and limited liability. It was these legal devices that provided the framework for corporate human rights, but it was the regional courts that facilitated the development and legitimation of those rights. Shifts in the global political economy have meant that the dominant (neoliberal capitalist) social order places the prerogatives of human rights squarely within the protection of private property and the private accumulation of capital. The ECtHR and the IACtHR have done their share in upholding this system and both ultimately protect the interests of business without necessarily providing the same protections from the harms committed by business.
	It is impossible to know for sure how, if established, an ASEAN human rights supervisory mechanism might address corporate accountability. We might speculate that given the ASEAN’s track-record, and the trend in human rights courts more generally, a business-friendly paradigm is likely. However, we might also consider how this mechanism might be shaped by ongoing and constant struggles to define human rights in the region. People-centred approaches led and endorsed by local populations, indigenous peoples and civil society organisations are playing a crucial part in resisting corporate power and exposing corporate harms in various ways, including through petitioning courts. These groups are contributing to and shaping discourses of human rights and corporate accountability. The “late” development of an ASEAN human rights regime might be advantageous in the sense that the grassroots are better organised than ever and they have made themselves indispensable to human rights and policy discussions. 
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^1	 	 Special thanks to the editors and two anonymous reviewers for their careful reading and constructive comments and suggestions. Also thanks to Emmanuelle Khoury and Pablo Ciocchini for helpful comments and discussions. All errors are my own.
^2	 	Examples in tort include Wiwa v Dutch Shell Petroleum (settled in 2009 for US$15.5 million), Doe I v Unocal (settled in 2005 on confidential terms), Xiaoning et al. v Yahoo! China et al. (settled in 2007 on confidential terms), Motto v Trafigura (settled in 2012 for £105 million). Both the UK and the USA provide for corporate criminal liability. The legislation in the UK includes the recent Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act (2007). For an overview of American federal law criminal liability see Doyle (2013). Examples of settlements in criminal courts count several banks for their role in the subprime crisis including Bank of America (close to US$75 billion), JPMorgan Chase (over US$27 billion), Citigroup (over US$12 billion), Goldman Sachs (almost US$1 billion); BNP Paribas (settled US$9 billion for breaches of American sanctions against Sudan and Iran); BP (settled US$13 billion for the Deepwater Horizon oil spill); Toyota (settled US$1.2 billion for faulty parts in some cars).
^3	 	The African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights is not included here because of its relative “youth” and the lack of cases adjudicated by the Court to date. It will be a key jurisdiction to follow for all those interested in corporate accountability given the exploitation of its member states’ natural resources by TNCs and the potential of its generous human rights guarantees enshrined in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981).
^4	 	The ECtHR has justified its consideration of corporations as rights-holders through Article 1, Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights: “Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his [sic!] possessions” (emphasis added). See Tombs and Whyte (2010) and Whyte (2007) for discussions on the popular view of corporations as “victims” of “crime” and as part of a broader “community of victims”.
^5	 	 See Footnote 4. On the drafting history of the ECHR, see e.g., Simpson (2001, 2004), Bates (2011), Khoury (2014), Khoury and Whyte (2017: 138-142). 
^6	 	 For an alternative reading, see Emberland (2006).
^7	 	 For more on the horizontal effect, see Clapham (1993, 2006). 
^8	 	 See also Third Report on the Human Rights Situation in Colombia (1999).
^9	  Peoples Tribunals are alternative justice mechanisms; examples of peoples’ tribunals include the Russell Tribunals, the Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal (PPT), the International Sakharov Hearings, the International Tribunal on Crimes against Women, the Ka Ho’ okolokolonui Kanaka Maoli (the Peoples’ International Tribunal) and the International Peoples’ Tribunal on Debt. 
^10	 	 Examples include Bowoto v Chevron Texaco, 2004; Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 2013; Sinaltrainal v Coca Cola, 2003; Kichwa Peoples of the Sarayaku community and its members v Ecuador, 2004; López Ostra v Spain, 1994; Sarei v Rio Tinto, 2002; Doe I v Unocal Corporation et al., 2000; Doe VIII v Exxon Mobil, 2001; Sahu (Janki Bai) et al. v Union Carbide Co., 2007.
^11	 	 Alimu (2017: 106) highlights the continued importance of FDI in the region commenting that, “According to the ASEAN Investment Report of 2015, FDI total flows to ASEAN countries rose for the third consecutive year, from $117.7 billion in 2013 to $136.2 billion in 2014 (Figure 1). This level exceeded FDI inflows to China for the first time since 1993, making ASEAN the largest recipient of FDI in the developing world.”
